We investigate whether and the extent to which four stakeholders of a firm -customers, suppliers, employees, and owners -benefit 
I. INTRODUCTION

B
usinesses operate under various incorporated and unincorporated organizational forms, each with their own unique tax and non-tax features (Scholes et al., 2014) . The corporate form provides centralized management, perpetual life, transferable ownership, and limited personal liability to its owners. However, income can be subject to taxation at the owner and entity level. In contrast, while partnerships and sole propri-etorships do not offer such non-tax benefits of incorporation, they incur only one layer of income tax -at the owner level. Prior research finds that income taxes, due to their material cost, are an important consideration in organizational form choice (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) . Nevertheless, studies identifying whether various stakeholders of a firm reap any tax-related benefits of organizational form are largely absent from the literature (Auerbach, 2006) . We fill this void by investigating whether and to what extent four parties -customers, suppliers, employees, and owners -benefit from the relative tax advantages of organizational form choice.
To isolate the tax advantages of organizational form, we consider two corporate forms that differ primarily on their treatment under the income tax: Subchapter C corporations and Subchapter S corporations. Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) levies an entity-level tax on corporate profits, which upon distribution (e.g., as dividends) are taxed again under the individual income tax. This structure is often referred to as double taxation. Under Subchapter S, however, corporations meeting specific criteria can elect to avoid the entity-level tax and instead "pass through" income, losses, deductions, and credits directly to shareholders, who are only subject to individual income taxes (Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 2013a) .
1 This single-layer tax advantage can be economically large. For instance, Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry (2015) estimate that 740 C corporation banks converting to S status from 1997-2010 realized tax savings of about 9.6 percent of net income in the first year alone. As a result, S corporations are a popular organizational form, comprising 44 percent of all business tax returns filed during 2012 (IRS, 2013b) . Apart from income taxes, Subchapter C and S corporations are legally the same type of entity. Subchapter S simply combines the legal benefits of incorporation with tax benefits similar to that of partnerships or sole proprietorships. Therefore, comparing S and C corporations offers a unique and powerful setting in which to identify the tax advantages of organizational form choice.
We use the setting of depository institutions (i.e., commercial banks) to investigate our research question because it offers several empirical advantages. First, both C and S corporation banks file Call Reports with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that specify organizational form. Other well-known databases, such as Compustat, largely contain only publicly-traded C corporations. Thus, identifying privately-held C and S corporations allows us to consider a broad portion of the economy in evaluating the consequences of organizational form choice.
2 Second, Call Reports provide a rich array of financial information, such as wages paid to employees, dividends paid to owners, and interest on deposits and loans. Presently, Compustat does not provide such granularity in the disclosure of income and expense items. This information allows us to identify which of the four different stakeholders benefit from the tax advantages of organizational form. Finally, the banking industry is relatively homogenous in terms of product offerings (loans), operations, accounting, and balance sheet composition (Beaver, McAnally, and Stinson, 1997) . Focusing on a relatively homogenous sample mitigates cross-industry and non-tax differences as alternative explanations of organizational form choice, which has been a challenge for prior research on corporate tax incidence (Sahni and Mathew, 1976; Auerbach, 2006) .
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Using a balanced sample of U.S.-headquartered commercial banks from 2001-2005, we find that tax-advantaged S corporation banks pay 2 percent more in wages and 38 percent more dividends than tax-disadvantaged C corporation banks. However, C and S corporation banks offer similar loan interest rates, while S banks pay lower interest rates on deposits. These results are consistent with employees and owners, but not suppliers or customers, benefiting from the tax advantages of S corporation status. Further, because employees and owners of C corporations are paid less than those of S corporations merely due to the different tax effects of organizational form, our results suggest that these parties bear at least some of the corporate tax burden.
In further tests using a difference-in-differences design, we find that S corporation banks increased wages and dividends to a lesser extent than C corporation banks after the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) reduced the relative tax advantage of Subchapter S. In particular, JGTRRA lessened the "sting" of double taxation by reducing the dividend tax rate from 38.6 to 15 percent, while providing only slight tax benefits to S corporation shareholders by reducing ordinary personal income tax rates (on which their share of S corporation profits are based) from 38.6 to 35 percent. This relatively large exogenous reduction in dividend tax rates relative to ordinary personal tax rates provides a powerful setting to validate that our findings are attributable to tax -rather than unobservable non-tax -factors between S and C corporations. We estimate that after JGTRRA, C banks increased wages and dividends by approximately 15 and 2 percent, respectively, while S banks increased wages by only 14 percent and did not significantly increase dividends. These results have two implications. First, they suggest that the reduction in shareholder tax rates not only directly benefited owners, but also employees, particularly for tax-disadvantaged C corporations. Second, the JGTRRA tests confirm our prior inference that employees and owners bear some portion of the incidence of corporate-level taxes. That is, when JGTRRA reduced the relative tax disadvantage of C over S status, C corporations narrowed the gap on wage and dividend payments compared to S corporations.
Our study contributes to research on taxes and organizational form (e.g., Shevlin, 1987; Petroni and Shackelford, 1995; Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson, 1996; Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry, 2015) by providing economic insight into which parties ultimately bear -and do not bear -the burden of corporate taxation. It also provides new insights into how the tax attributes of corporations can have a real effect on employees. Finally, we contribute to the literature on depository institutions (Ryan, 2007) by identifying tax factors that appear to affect payout policies to bank employees and owners, but interestingly, not depositors or borrowers.
We proceed as follows. Section II provides background information and develops our hypotheses. Our empirical methodology and main results are described in Sections III and IV, respectively. Section V reports robustness tests, and Section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A. Organizational Form
The choice of organizational form affects numerous facets of business, including taxation, access to capital, and liability exposure (Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson, 1996) . For example, MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) show that profitable firms are reluctant to adopt the corporate form due to the tax costs of operating as a C corporation. More recently, Allen and Raghavan (2012) find that some loss firms organize as C corporations rather than more tax-advantaged forms due to the operating preferences of private equity investors. Extant research also suggests that income taxes explain the use of general partnerships (Guenther, 1992) , limited partnerships (Shevlin, 1987) , master limited partnerships (Terando and Omer, 1993; Gentry, 1994; Shelley, Omer, and Atwood, 1998) , and real estate investment trusts (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2002) .
Although taxation plays a role in organizational form choice, its relative importance is unclear. For instance, Goolsbee (1998) finds that the effect of taxes on organizational form choice was negligible during 1900-1939, while other research suggests non-tax factors (e.g., financial reporting benefits, business risk, firm age, and firm size) affect organizational form choices to a greater extent than tax factors (Beatty, Berger, and Magliolo, 1995; Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson, 1996) . Evidence on the tax consequences of organizational form is also rather limited. For example, Erickson and Wang (2007) conclude that mergers with S corporations elicit a higher price premium relative to mergers with C corporations, and Erickson and Wang (2000) find that tax elections that generate future tax savings for acquirers lead to higher purchase prices. This evidence suggests that buyers and sellers of a firm share the tax advantages of Subchapter S.
In this study, we consider two incorporated organizational forms: Subchapter C and Subchapter S corporations. S corporations and C corporations differ almost entirely on tax features. Historically, in the United States corporate profits are subject to two levels of taxation under Subchapter C. First, C corporations incur an entity-level tax at corporate rates as they earn income. Second, shareholders incur an individual-level tax at shareholder rates upon the receipt of dividends. However, in 1958, Congress amended the IRC to include Subchapter S, which allowed corporations meeting specific criteria to elect out of Subchapter C's entity-level income tax. In lieu of an entity-level tax, an S corporation's shareholders pay tax at individual ordinary rates on their percentage share of earned (rather than distributed) corporate income. Thus, S corporations pay a single layer of tax at the shareholder level rather than the double layer of tax faced by C corporations. As predominately a tax election, Subchapter S offers the traditional benefits of incorporation combined with the tax benefits of a pass-through entity.
Despite these benefits, S corporations face restrictions and disadvantages. For example, only a limited number and specific types of shareholders can own S corporations. To qualify, an S corporation must: (1) be incorporated domestically; (2) have only individual and certain trust/estate shareholders (i.e., partnerships, corporations, and non-resident alien shareholders are prohibited); (3) have a maximum of 100 shareholders; and (4) have only a single class of stock. The S corporation form also provides for fewer tax deferral opportunities as shareholders are immediately taxed on their share of income, regardless of whether income is actually distributed. Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry (2015) , provides a stylized example of the tax savings of S corporations relative to C corporations for the corporation and its owners, both before and after JGTRRA reduced both the dividend tax rate (from 38.6 to 15 percent) and ordinary personal tax rates (from 38.6 to 35 percent). In the example, we use the average dividend payout ratio for our sample of 39 percent. We note three important features. First, the double taxation of C corporations provides S corporations with a relative tax advantage in that income is only taxed once at the owner level. Although the income allocated to S corporation shareholders is immediately taxed at ordinary personal rates, which is similar to the corporate rate, S corporations do not pay entity-level taxes and their owners do not pay taxes on dividends received. Second, JGTRRA reduced the overall tax burden for both C and S corporations, with after-tax income increasing by 18.43 and 5.86 percent, respectively. The reduction in dividend tax rates benefited C corporation owners by reducing the level of double taxation, while the reduction in personal tax rates provided a benefit, albeit smaller, to S corporation owners. Third, despite an increase in absolute tax benefits for both S and C corporations after JGTRRA, the relative tax advantage of S over C corporations declined from 22.93 to 9.89 percent. 4 Auerbach (2006) reviews the economic theory and evidence about which parties bear the corporate income tax burden. Early research suggests that firm owners bear a large portion of the burden, while later research (Harberger, 1962) concludes that owners bear the burden in proportion to the overall level of corporate capital within an economy, with the non-corporate sector bearing the residual burden. Harberger (1962) also finds that customers, suppliers, and employees bear no burden. More recently, Clausing (2013) and Gravelle (2013) find empirical evidence in support of Harberger's (1962) contention that capital owners exclusively bear the burden of corporate taxation. However, Liu and Altshuler (2013) outline the possibility that non-owner stakeholders bear some of the burden. Specifically, they note that if capital moves between jurisdictions to avoid taxation, other less mobile parties might bear some portion of the overall tax. Consistent with other recent research (Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini, 2012 ; aus dem Moore and Kasten, 2009), Liu and Altshuler (2013) conclude that employees bear a majority of the corporate tax burden.
B. Hypothesis Development
Aside from owners and employees, other stakeholders may bear a portion of corporate tax incidence. For instance, Goolsbee (1998) finds that some suppliers reap the benefits of lower taxes via higher prices, and Sebold (1979) estimates that 69 percent of changes in corporate taxes are passed on to customers. Finally, Ablett and Hart (2006, p. 47) conclude that, "despite [all] this work [on corporate tax incidence], unambiguous incidence conclusions remain elusive." Thus, whether and the extent to which different stakeholders bear the corporate tax burden are open empirical questions.
While we are interested in which stakeholders benefit from lower corporate taxes, such evidence also sheds light on who bears the burden of corporate taxes. Ex ante, it is not clear who will benefit from lower corporate taxes because competing arguments suggest several parties will reap some benefits. For instance, along the lines of Sebold (1979) , if customers benefit from the tax-advantaged S corporation status, we state the following hypotheses (in alternative form):
H1a: S corporations charge lower interest rates on loans than C corporations.
H1b: Interest rates on loans will decrease to a lesser extent for S corporations than for C corporations after JGTRRA.
Depositors could also benefit from the tax advantages of S status. Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry (2015) find a 4.5 percent increase in the market share of deposits among banks that convert from a C to an S corporation. They attribute this increase in deposits to increased advertising and the opening of new bank branches. Although deposits appear to increase after conversion to S corporation status, their findings leave open whether S banks, as one strategy, pass on a portion of the tax advantages to depositors through increased interest rates. To the extent that depositors benefit from S corporation status, we state the following hypotheses (in alternative form):
H2a: S corporations pay higher interest rates on deposits than C corporations.
H2b: Interest rates on deposits will increase to a lesser extent for S corporations than for C corporations after JGTRRA.
Historically, banks were ineligible for Subchapter S status. However, the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 amended the IRC to allow banks the option of electing S status (but no other status) as of 1997, provided that other criteria (e.g., number of shareholders) are satisfied. One goal of this deregulation was to enhance small business lending and increase the take-home pay of workers. Thus, a stated intention of the Act was for customers and employees of banks to reap the tax benefits of Subchapter S. Moreover, Hein, Koch, and MacDonald (2005) suggest smaller commercial banks, many of which are S corporations, view attracting and retaining qualified employees as a competitive advantage. They argue that smaller banks can provide loan officers with greater flexibility and compensation compared to larger banks through relationshipbuilding. The idea is that high quality loan officers can attract new bank customers. Thus, both employees and customers can benefit from the S corporation form. To the extent that employees benefit from S corporation status, we state the following hypotheses (in alternative form):
H3a: S corporations pay greater employee wages than C corporations.
H3b: Employee wages will increase to a lesser extent for S corporations than for C corporations after JGTRRA.
Finally, based on the strict capital requirements imposed on banks by regulators, muted capital mobility suggests that owners bear the burden and, as a result, should benefit from the tax-advantaged S corporation organizational form. Insofar as owners benefit from S corporation status, we state the following hypotheses (in alternative form):
H4a: S corporations pay greater dividends to shareholders than C corporations.
H4b: Dividend payments to shareholders will increase to a lesser extent for S corporations than for C corporations after JGTRRA.
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY A. Research Design
We first test H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4a using a pooled cross-sectional regression. We then test H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b (i.e., the JGTRRA effects) using difference-indifferences (DID) (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Campbell, et al., 2013; Donohoe, 2015) . A DID design is well-suited for our research question as it removes time-invariant differences between S and C corporations as well as common trends affecting both types of banks (Roberts and Whited, 2013) . In particular, we estimate the following OLS models, adjusting standard errors for clustering at the bank level:
The dependent variable (Outcome) is one of four measures representing each of the four stakeholders of interest. First, to capture the tax effects of organizational form on bank customers (H1), we define the interest rate charged on loans (LoanRate) as the ratio of interest income received on loans to year-end loan balance. Second, to consider the effects on bank suppliers (H2), we define the interest rate paid on deposits (DepRate) as interest expense paid on deposits divided by year-end deposits balance. Third, to reflect the effects on employees (H3), we define the average wage paid to employees (Wage) as the natural log of the ratio of total wages to the number of full-time equivalent employees. Finally, to capture the effect of taxes on bank owners (H4), we use the ratio of dividends to the absolute value of pre-tax income (Div).
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SBank is an indicator variable that equals one for Subchapter S banks and zero for Subchapter C banks. The coefficient for SBank (b 1 ) in (1) captures the average difference in the outcome variable between S and C banks over the entire sample period, while the same coefficient in (2) captures the difference in outcome variables between S and C banks before JGTRRA. Post in (2) equals one for observations in the post-JGTRRA period (i.e., after 2003) and zero otherwise, and reflects the average change in the outcome variable among all banks after JGTRRA. Finally, the coefficient for SBank×Post (b 3 ) in (2) is the DID estimator, which captures the effect of JGTRRA on the outcome variable for S banks relative to C banks.
Ctrl is a vector of control variables that influence bank behavior. We include the log of the population of the state in which a bank is headquartered (Pop), as well as the change in state-level gross domestic product (GDP). To accommodate differences in bargaining power and resources (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) , we include the log of bank assets (Size). Following prior studies (Blankespoor, et al., 2013; Jin, et al., 2013) , we include three measures of bank performance: (1) lagged ratio of pre-tax income to assets (LagRoa); (2) ratio of non-performing loans to net loans (NPL); and (3) percentage change in loans in the current year (LoanGrow). We also control for financial health and cumulative performance with Lev, the ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets, and Cap, a bank's Tier 1 capital ratio. Finally, year fixed-effects (Year) control for time-period specific shocks unrelated to JGTRRA. 7 We select this time period as it contains two years before and after the enactment of JGTRRA in 2003. This approach allows for sufficient power to detect structural breaks, but is sufficiently narrow to mitigate threats to internal validity (e.g., Donohoe and McGill, 2011) . We omit 2003 as research suggests that firm-level responses to JGTRRA occurred with a delay (Zhang, Farrel, and Brown, 2008; Campbell et al., 2013) . We then restrict the sample to firms that report no foreign or public ownership (28,837 observations). 8 We also require banks to have the necessary data to estimate (1) and (2) (26,302 observations). We then drop bank failures and conversions/revocations to S status (leaving 23,411 observations). Finally, we require a balanced sample (21,204 observations) of banks that operate in a state with at least one other S bank (20,096 observations) to mitigate the likelihood that sample composition changes or local banking regulations, respectively, influence our results (Luna and Murray, 2010) . 9 The primary sample consists of 5,024 unique banks, 27.7 percent of which operate as S corporations. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. (Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry, 2015) . In untabulated mean tests of differences, we find that relative to C banks, S banks charge slightly higher interest rates on loans (7.4 percent versus 7.3 percent, p<0.01) and pay slightly lower interest rates on deposits (2.3 percent versus 2.2 percent, p<0.01).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics
10 Both S and C banks pay employees an average wage (Wage) of $45,900 (p>0.40). These tests suggest the tax advantages of Subchapter S do not accrue to customers, suppliers, or employees. However, S banks pay out 69.9 percent of their 7 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 increased the number of eligible S corporation shareholders from 75 to 100. Although this change relaxes the restrictions on which firms can operate under Subchapter S, it does not influence the relative tax advantages of the S corporation form and thus should not influence our results. 8 This restriction reduces the likelihood that alternative explanations related to non-tax features of C corporations are driving our results because S corporations cannot be foreign-owned and the limitation on the number of shareholders essentially prevents S corporations from being publicly traded. 9 We remove banks operating in Alaska, Washington DC, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Vermont. Including banks from these states does not influence our results. 10 The standard errors (0.0001 and 0.0002) for these mean tests of differences are relatively small because the interval is bounded between 0 percent and 100 percent. Thus, a 0.1 percent difference is statistically significant.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics Notes: LoanRate is the ratio of interest income received on loans to year-end loan balance. DepRate is the ratio of interest expense paid on deposits to yearend deposits balance. Wage is the log of the ratio of total wages to the number of full-time equivalent employees. Div is the ratio of dividends to the absolute value of pre-tax income. SBank equals 1 for Subchapter S banks and 0 for Subchapter C banks. Pop is the log of the population in the state in which the bank is headquartered. GDP is the change in state-level gross domestic product. Size is the log of bank assets. LagRoa is the lagged ratio of pre-tax income to total assets. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans. LoanGrow is the percentage change in loans in the current year. Lev is the ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets. Cap is the bank's Tier 1 capital ratio.
earnings as dividends (Div), while C banks pay only 28.2 percent (p<0.01). This result is consistent with S bank owners benefiting from the tax advantages of the S corporation form. Nevertheless, we conduct multivariate tests before making inferences. Table 3 reports estimates of (1), where the dependent variable is indicated in each column heading for the relevant stakeholder outcome. In Column 1, the coefficient for SBank is insignificant when LoanRate is the outcome. In Column 2, we find a negative and significant (p<0.01) coefficient for SBank when DepRate is the dependent variable, suggesting that S banks pay less to suppliers (i.e., depositors) than C banks. These results are not consistent with H1a or H2a, implying that customers and suppliers do not reap the tax benefits of S status. However, in Columns 3 and 4 we find positive and significant coefficients for SBank (p<0.01), suggesting S banks pay employees more in wages and owners more in dividends than C banks during the sample period. These results are consistent with H3a and H4a, suggesting that employees and owners, respectively, reap relatively more benefits of the S corporation form over the C corporation form. Table 4 reports estimates of (2), where we again indicate the outcome of interest in the column heading. In Column 1, the coefficients for SBank and SBank×Post are insignificant when LoanRate is the outcome. In Column 2, we find negative and significant coefficients for SBank and SBank×Post when DepRate is the dependent variable, consistent with lower interest rates on deposits for S banks. However, these results are not consistent with the tax benefits of S corporations accruing to depositors because S corporations did not pay lower interest rates before JGTRRA. Instead, Columns 1 and 2 suggest that customers and suppliers, respectively, do not reap the benefits of S corporation status (i.e., the results are inconsistent with H1b and H2b).
B. Multivariate Tests
The results in Columns 3 and 4 indicate that while employees and owners of S banks reap benefits of the S corporation form (as predicted by H3b and H4b, respectively), these benefits declined after JGTRRA reduced the relative tax disadvantage of C corporations. First, the positive and significant coefficients for SBank in Columns 3 and 4 confirm that S banks pay employees more wages and owners more dividends, respectively, than C banks. Second, consistent with JGTRRA lowering the tax burden of both C and S banks, the coefficients for Post are positive and significant in Columns 3 and 4. These findings suggest that when statutory tax rates decline, sample banks increase both salaries and dividends. Third, consistent with S corporations realizing fewer tax benefits from JGTRRA than C corporations, the coefficients for SBank×Post are negative and significant. These results suggest that while S banks increased wages after JGTRRA, they did so to a lesser extent than C banks, because JGTRRA lowered their tax burden (i.e., personal ordinary tax rates) by a lesser amount than it lowered the dividend tax rate. Specifically, by summing the coefficients for Post and SBank×Post, we find that S banks did not increase their dividends after JGTRRA (p>0.76). Finally, consistent with Notes: Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by bank (Petersen, 2009) . Table 2 provides a list of variable definitions. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. S banks enjoying a relative tax advantage over C banks, albeit to a lesser extent after JGTRRA, the sum of coefficients for SBank and SBank×Post are significantly positive when either Wage or Div is the dependent variable (p<0.05).
To gauge the economic size of the employee wage results, we follow Kennedy (1981) and Donohoe and Knechel (2014) . We multiply all coefficient estimates in Column 3 of Table 4 by the mean values for the corresponding variables, and incrementally add the coefficients for SBank, Post, and SBank×Post. We then compute the raw dollar value by exponentiating the summed value and multiplying by 1,000, as the figures in Call Reports are denominated in thousands of dollars. We find that annually, on average, S banks pay employees $43,363 whereas C banks pay $42,381, a difference of $981. After JGTRRA, S banks pay employees $49,690 and C banks pay $49,092, a difference of $597. Although these amounts seem modest, they are economically meaningful for at least two reasons. First, these values represent per employee annual averages. When we multiply these amounts by the average number of employees for banks in our sample (56.25), we find that the average S bank pays about $55,237 more in total wages than the average C bank, and $33,626 more after JGTRRA. Second, at the beginning of the sample period, the median wage in the United States was $21,767.
11 The wage premiums related to the S corporation form thus represent a 4.5 percent average increase (2.7 percent after JGTRRA) in the median American's compensation.
We evaluate dividends in a similar fashion. We multiply the coefficients for SBank, Post, and SBank×Post in Column 4 of Table 4 by the average absolute value of pretax income, the scalar of Div ($2,437). We then multiply the result by 1,000. We find that the average S bank pays $270,618 more in dividends per year than the average C bank. After JGTRRA, all banks increase dividend payouts by approximately $12,578, on average; however, S banks increase dividends by $14,916 less than C banks.
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
We evaluate the robustness of our results by re-estimating (2) after including firm fixed-effects. This adjustment mitigates correlated omitted variables bias because any confounding variable must be correlated with the sample bank over time (Wooldridge, 2010) . Table 5 reports the results. Note that SBank is omitted from the model because it does not vary by firm and would otherwise be collinear with the firm-specific intercept. We find positive coefficients for Post when Wage or Div is the dependent variable (p<0.01), consistent with reductions in corporate tax rates benefiting employees and owners. In line with our main results, we find negative and significant coefficients for SBank×Post when Wage or Div is the dependent variable (p<0.01), consistent with JGTRRA lowering the tax burden on S corporations to a lesser extent than it did for C corporations. As before, we find insignificant coefficients when LoanRate or DepRate is the dependent variable. Notes: SBank is omitted as it does not vary by firm and would otherwise be collinear with the firm-specific intercept. Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by bank (Petersen, 2009) . Post equals 1 for observations in the post-JGTRRA period (after 2003); 0 otherwise. Table 2 provides a list of variable definitions. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Notes: The sample is restricted to banks operating only in a single state to ensure our main results are not due to differences in geographic scope among S and C banks. Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by bank (Petersen, 2009) . Post equals 1 for observations in the post-JGTRRA period (after 2003); 0 otherwise. Table 2 provides a list of variable definitions. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. (Petersen, 2009) . Post equals 1 for observations in the post-JGTRRA period (after 2003); 0 otherwise. Table 2 provides a list of variable definitions. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
In addition, we examine whether differences in bank strategy or scope influence our results. S corporations face restrictions on issuing equity, which likely constrain their ability to expand nationally or pursue capital-intensive strategies. Thus, we limit our sample on two dimensions to ensure we are comparing relatively homogenous C and S banks. First, to consider whether our results for S corporation banks are due to differences in geographic scope, we estimate (2) on a subsample of banks that operate in a single state (19,476 observations) . 12 We report the results in Table 6 . Similar to our main results, we find that S corporations pay employees more in wages and owners more in dividends (p<0.01 in both cases), on average. Further, after JGTRRA, all banks, on average, increase wages and dividends, but S corporations do so to a significantly lesser extent. Second, we remove any bank from the sample that is larger than the largest S bank in the sample (Beal Bank of Plano, TX, which holds about $5.5 billion in assets during 2002) to examine whether our results are driven by economies of scale. Table  7 reports the results. Using this subsample of 20,064 bank-years, we find evidence consistent with our main analyses.
Finally, S banks are not geographically distributed on a random basis (Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry, 2015) . Thus, S banks could face a different average level of competition than C banks, which might influence how banks shift the burden of taxation to different stakeholders. To examine this possibility, we estimate (1) and (2) after including two controls for competition: (1) the Herfindahl Index (HHI) of deposits at the state level; and (2) an indicator variable (Rural) equal to one for banks headquartered in a rural county (zero otherwise). 13 We find evidence (untabulated) consistent with our main tests, suggesting that competition is not an alternative explanation. We also find that HHI has a positive (negative) and significant relation with Wage (Div), and that banks in rural counties (Rural) pay lower wages and more dividends than non-rural banks.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study examines whether and the extent to which tax benefits from the S corporation organizational form accrue to customers, suppliers, employees, and/or owners. While similar along many non-tax dimensions, including limited personal liability, centralized management, and perpetual life, S corporations are subject to only one layer of tax (at the owner level) compared to C corporations that are subject to two layers of tax (at both the entity and owner levels). We find evidence consistent with employees and owners benefiting from the S corporation form through higher wages and dividends. However, customers and suppliers do not seem to benefit as deposit and loan interest rates do not systematically differ between the two organizational forms. Further, to ensure that tax rather than unobservable non-tax attributes between the two corporate organizational forms explain our results, we validate our findings using the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), which dramatically reduced the tax advantage of S corporations over C corporations by lowering the dividend tax rate. Consistent with our primary inferences, we find that the wage premium and dividend payout rate for S corporations were attenuated following JGTRRA relative to that of C corporations.
Our findings should be relevant to researchers, policymakers, and regulators. We find some evidence supporting a stated intention of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA), which aimed to increased employee wages by allowing banks to change their organizational form from Subchapter C to Subchapter S status. However, we do not find support for the SBJPA's goal of facilitating lower loan interest rates for bank customers. Our findings should also be informative to the current debate regarding corporate tax incidence. Importantly, our evidence suggests that a reduced (increased) corporate tax burden seems to benefit (harm) both employees and owners while leaving customers and suppliers unaffected.
